Section 1681(b) was patterned after 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. at 71,413. 1681-1688, provides that no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Co. of Am., 94 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.1996). Brown loses and is required to restore the programs. 118 Cong.Rec. Id. 1993) (hereinafter Moore). - 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. at 205. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, and Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir.1990) (It is settled in this circuit that issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to have been abandoned.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have held that only a few exceptional circumstances can overcome the interests served by adherence to the doctrine and these exceptions are narrowly circumscribed. The Court has been especially critical of the use of statistical evidence offered to prove generalized, stereotypical notions about men and women. The original Cohen case was settled in 1998 by Joint Agreement. Of course, a remedy that requires an institution to cut, add, or elevate the status of athletes or entire teams may impact the genders differently, but this will be so only if there is a gender-based disparity with respect to athletics opportunities to begin with, which is the only circumstance in which prong three comes into play. Third, even if Adarand did apply, it does not dictate the level of scrutiny to be applied in this case, as Brown concedes. U.S. District Court Senior . With these precepts in mind, we first examine the compliance plan Brown submitted to the district court in response to its order. at 320, 97 S.Ct. at 71,416. In its liability analysis, the district court expressly accepted Cohen II' s elucidation of the applicable law, Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. In so doing, we upheld the district court's analysis and ruled that an institution violates Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates its students' interests and abilities in athletics under 34 C.F.R. at 2113. 2755, 2762-63, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976). at 189-90. Brown . of Cal. at 189 n. 6. at 197-99; accord Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (holding that neither the regulation nor the policy interpretation run afoul of the dictates of Title IX). While this court has approved the importation of Title VII standards into Title IX analysis, we have explicitly limited the crossover to the employment context. Brown claims that the district court erred in excluding evidence pertaining to the relative athletic interests of men and women at the university. How could an academic institution with a large and diverse student body ever fully accommodate the athletic interests of its students? how many athletic teams in Brown University by 1991? Brown contends that we are free to disregard the prior panel's explication of the law in Cohen II. In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Adarand, 515 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. 1817, 1821-22, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (stating that even though the statute at issue applied equally to members of different racial classifications, it still implicated race-related Equal Protection concerns, since the statute itself contained race-conscious classifications). District Court Order at 5-6. (ii) Head coaches of all teams must field squads that meet minimum size requirements. The district court's decision to fashion specific relief was made, in part, to avoid protracted litigation over the compliance plan and to expedite the appeal on the issue of liability. In this unique context, Title IX operates to ensure that the gender-segregated allocation of athletics opportunities does not disadvantage either gender. at ----, 115 S.Ct. 10. According to the district court, the unmet interests of the underrepresented sex must be completely accommodated before any of the interest of the overrepresented gender can be accommodated.28. 3331, 3336-37, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 97 S.Ct. In Frontiero, a plurality of the Court concluded that gender-based classifications, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 688, 93 S.Ct. at 202, 97 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854, Brown concludes that strict scrutiny applies to gender-based classifications.21 Appellant's Br. 29. 20 U.S.C. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 903. Later in the opinion, however, when the level of interest among women at Brown is at issue, the court adopts a much more critical attitude towards statistical evidence: [T]here exists the danger that, rather than providing a true measure of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest instead provides only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of opportunity. Majority Opinion at 179. Cases and commentators sometimes treat cases involving involuntarily implemented plans-e.g., plans adopted pursuant to a consent decree or a contempt order-as affirmative action cases. 978, 1001 (D.R.I.1992) ("Cohen I "). We assume, without deciding, that Brown has not waived its equal protection claim and has standing to raise it. [24] This provision governs the distribution of athletic scholarships under the general caption of financial assistance in education programs. To do so, the school must fully and effectively accommodate the underrepresented gender's interests and abilities, even if that requires it to give the underrepresented gender (in this case, women) what amounts to a larger slice of a shrinking athletic-opportunity pie. 2305, 2310-11, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984)).9. Because the standard has changed, it is conceivable that the result of the analysis will change, making review appropriate. The Policy Interpretation was designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics.12 44 Fed.Reg. I conclude, therefore, that Adarand and Virginia are irreconcilable with the analysis in Cohen II and, accordingly, we must follow the guidance of the Supreme Court in this appeal. at 210-13. The court found, however, that it is difficult for donor-funded varsity athletes to maintain a level of competitiveness commensurate with their abilities and that these athletes operate at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to university-funded varsity athletes. The concern informing this caveat arises when we are asked to rule on the propriety of a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction (or otherwise issue a preliminary ruling) without benefit of full argument and a well-developed record. The Court's 7-1 decision established the "separate but equal" doctrine. We note that Brown presses its relative interests argument under both prong one and prong three. 23. It is well established, however, that a decision of the Supreme Court, that is rendered between two appeals and is irreconcilable with the decision on the first appeal, must be followed on the second appeal. at 29; Reply Br. at 469, 109 S.Ct. This is a class action lawsuit charging Brown University, its president, and its athletic director (collectively "Brown") with violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. This extreme action is entirely unnecessary. See Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. Although the Court in two places asks whether the State has demonstrated that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives the Court never answers the question presented in anything resembling that form. Id. During the same period, Brown's undergraduate enrollment comprised 5,722 students, of which 48.86% (2,796) were men and 51.14% (2,926) were women. 39,251-52 (remarks of Rep. Mink and Rep. Green). 2816, 2830-31, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993)). Brown asserts, in the alternative, that if the district court properly construed the test, then the test itself violates Title IX and the United States Constitution. It is women and not men who have historically and who continue to be underrepresented in sports, not only at Brown, but at universities nationwide. See United States v. Virginia, 518U.S. Second, the standard of review has changed. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995), however, courts applying intermediate scrutiny sometimes allowed benign gender classifications on the grounds that they were a reasonable means of compensating women as a class for past discrimination. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Novack, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law 18.23, at 277; see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 97 S.Ct. at 71,413. at ----, 116 S.Ct. Thus, although we understand the district court's reasons for substituting its own specific relief under the circumstances at the time, and although the district court's remedy is within the statutory margins and constitutional, we think that the district court was wrong to reject out-of-hand Brown's alternative plan to reduce the number of men's varsity teams. This action was taken to ensure that the Order was final for purposes of this court's jurisdiction, and to expedite the appeal process. at n. 1. Brown's rehashed statutory challenge is foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine and we are therefore bound by the prior panel's interpretation of the statute, the regulation, and the relevant agency pronouncements. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. The context of the case has changed in two significant respects since Brown presented its original plan. This prong surely requires statistical balancing. Serv. to participate in their sports as "intercollegiate clubs," but would not receive financial assistance from the university. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting cases).22. The court's remedial order required Brown to elevate and maintain at university-funded varsity status the women's gymnastics, fencing, skiing, and water polo teams. Section 1681(b) provides: Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section or other area. (1993) - Free download as PDF File (.pdf) or read online for free. 497 U.S. at 564-65, 110 S.Ct. 572, 577-78, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975). See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694, 99 S.Ct. E.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 102 S.Ct. (We note that the text of the 1990 Investigator's Manual cited herein at page 25 was apparently at page 27 of the copy of the Manual before the district court.). The panel cited as authority Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565-66, 110 S.Ct. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 117 Cong.Rec. at 189. We do not question Cohen II's application of 1681(b). Expanding women's athletic opportunities in areas where there is proven ability and interest is the very purpose of Title IX and the simplest, least disruptive, route to Title IX compliance at Brown.