Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. This appeal followed. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. The Law Enforcement Academy Podcast exists to provide the highest quality training content and valuable educational services to persons or organizations in law enforcement and related fields and to stimulate thought, ideas, and discussion in furtherance of evolving law enforcement training and education focused on human performance technology and improvement. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Plakas charged [the police officer] with the poker raised. A volunteer fireman found him walking . The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. He fled but she caught him. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. Filing 89. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. 2. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one Conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. Cited 45 times, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) | At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. He tried to avoid violence. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. 1989). He moved toward her. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Cain left. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Cited 77 times, 980 F.2d 299 (1992) | But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." It is significant he never yelled about a beating. This guiding principle does not fit well here. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Id. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1148; Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 151 F.3d at 1318-19. This conclusion accords comfortably with the opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (7th Cir. Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. Before CUMMINGS and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ZAGEL, District Judge.*. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Rptr. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). She fired and missed. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. 3. This appeal followed. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Dockets & Filings. george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . Justia. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. French v. State, 273 Ind. 1992). 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